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INTRODUCTION
Every day in the United States approximately fifty percent of
adult consumers take at least one prescription drug.1 In 2005,
American consumers spent over 200 billion dollars on prescription
drugs,2 a number that is projected to rise to almost 500 billion by
2016.3 As the amount of money American consumers spend on drugs
rises, more American consumers struggle to pay for those drugs they
need on a daily basis. Meanwhile, across the border in Canada,
consumers pay up to forty percent less for the same drugs.4 The same
*

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Certificate in Intellectual Property; B.S.E. Chemical Engineering, May
2005, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
1
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH POLL REPORT: PRESCRIPTION DRUG
USE 1 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/feb_2005/1.cfm.
2
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS FACT SHEET: MAY
2007 UPDATE 1 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_06.pdf.
3
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS FACT SHEET: MAY
2007 UPDATE 4 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_06.pdf.
4
Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Why We Pay So Much For Drugs,
TIME, Feb. 2, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1101040202-581399,00.html.
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is true for the cost of drugs in many other countries throughout the
world.5 Amid American consumers’ battle to pay for their drugs,
profits are soaring for pharmaceutical companies. For instance, in
2006, Pfizer reported $19.3 billion in profits,6 Merck reported $4.4
billion in profits,7 and Abbott Laboratories reported $1.7 billion in
profits.8 Many critics argue that the pharmaceutical companies are
indifferent to American consumers’ financial struggle to pay for their
drugs, putting their own profits before the public’s needs.9 Yet, the
research and development of pharmaceutical companies has yielded
countless drugs upon which the public has come to depend.
The public has pressured Congress to follow the lead of other
countries to help make drug prices more affordable for American
consumers.10 Many countries outside of the United States regulate
5

Mike Adams, 28 Senators Vote to Maintain Big Pharma Monopoly Over U.S.
Consumers; Republicans Oppose Free-Trade for Medicine, NEWSTARGET.COM,
May 7, 2007, http://www.newstarget.com/z021831.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2007)
(claiming Canadians, Europeans and Mexicans pay from one-half to one-tenth the
price that American consumers pay for their prescription drugs). See also Gardiner
Harris, The Nation: Prescriptions Filled; If Americans Want to Pay Less for Drugs,
They Will, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003.
6
PFIZER, PFIZER FINANCIAL REPORT 1 (2006), http://www.pfizer.com/investors/
financial_reports/financial_report_2006.jsp (select “Financial Summary” from drop
down menu).
7
MERCK, UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 10K 117 (2007), http://www.merck.com/finance/proxy/2006_form_10-k.pdf.
8
ABBOTT, ABBOTT 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2006), http://www.abbott.com/
static/content/microsite/annual_report/2006/support_files/abbott_ar06_financial.pdf.
9
Mike Hall, What Drug Companies Aren’t Telling YOU, America@work, May
2003, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/publications/magazine/0503_
bigfix.cfm; Cf. MASSPIRG, Prescription Action Litigation Project,
http://masspirg.org/health-care/safe-amp-affordable-drugs/prescription-actionlitigation-project (discussing class action lawsuit against major pharmaceutical
companies for price gouging).
10
See, e.g., H.R. 194, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing tax credits for persons of
“retirement” age for their prescription drugs); Prescription Drug Affordability Act of
2006, H.R. 4706, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposing depriving prescription drug
manufacturers of certain tax deductions in an effort to lower drug prices);
Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2005, H.R. 563, 108th Cong. (2005)
(proposing that the Secretary of Health and Human Services negotiate the lowest
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their drug prices in one of three ways: (1) directly by price controls;
(2) indirectly by reimbursement limits for social insurance used by
their citizens; or (3) indirectly by profit controls.11 Pharmaceutical
companies are forced to comply with these drug regulations, resulting
in their brand name drugs being sold abroad at outwardly reduced
prices.12
Although Congress has shown an effort to consider some of these
foreign cost-cutting methods, a large-scale change has not yet
happened.13 In the meantime, some American consumers have taken it
upon themselves to engage in potentially dangerous and illegal costcutting measures. Some consumers report that they skip doses to make
a prescription last longer or simply do not fill a prescription that they
may need because of its cost.14 Other consumers have turned to
seemingly legitimate online pharmacies that tout brand name drugs at
a highly reduced cost,15 while still other consumers cross the border
and buy prescription drugs in Canada or Mexico.16
Recognizing the drug industry’s huge earnings and the public’s
increasing demand for low-cost prescription drugs, creative
entrepreneurs have explored ways to enter the lucrative prescription
drug market. One way these entrepreneurs become involved is by

possible pricing for Medicare beneficiaries and provide waivers to allow importation
of prescription drugs from Canada).
11
Patricia M. Danzon, Making Sense of Drug Prices, REGULATION, Spring
2000, 56, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n1/danzon.pdf.
12
Id.
13
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14
Patricia Barry, Chasing Drugs: Many Readers Take Drastic Steps to Get
Prescription Medicine, AARP BULLETIN, October, 2003, http://www.aarp.org/
bulletin/prescription/Articles/a2003-09-29-chasing_drugs.html.
15
Id.; see also Michelle Meadows, Saving Money on Prescription Drugs, FDA
Consumer, Sept.–Oct., 2005, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2005/
505_save.html.
16
Barlett, supra note 4, at 1. See also HHS TASK FORCE, REPORT ON
PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION IX (2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
importtaskforce/Report1220.pdf.
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importing substandard or counterfeit drugs.17 A second way is by
purchasing brand name drugs manufactured abroad and importing
them into the United States, a practice known as parallel imports.18
This practice is theoretically legal under U.S. law because it is only
unlawful to re-import drugs originally manufactured in the United
States but shipped for sale abroad.19 Genendo Pharmaceutical, N.V.
(“Genendo”), a corporation based in the Netherlands, used this latter
method in its course of business.20 However, in 2003, when Genendo
attempted to import a shipment of Lipitor manufactured and packaged
abroad by Pfizer (“the imported Lipitor”), the government seized the
drugs at the border, and sought their condemnation as unapproved new
drugs.21 The district court ruled in favor of the government on all
counts.22
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the court was presented with a
question of statutory interpretation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 353 and 355, and
17

Calvert et al., Factory for Fake Prescription Drugs, THE SUNDAY TIMES
(U.K.), Sept. 23, 2007, at Insight, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/uk/health/article2511583.ece.
18
United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (N.D.
Ill. 2005), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th
Cir. 2007). See also Press Release, Genendo Pharmaceutical, NV, Trial Challenging
the FDA’s Pharmaceutical Importation Ban to Begin May 2nd, (Apr. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=145004. Parallel
imports are genuine products (as opposed to counterfeit) that come from an area
where the products are sold at discounted prices, in comparison to where the
products will be imported (here, the U.S.).
19
21 U.S.C. § 353 (2006).
20
1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
21
Id. at 1211. The process of seizure is based upon 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2006).
Under the FDA’s Regulatory Procedures, the United States files a Complaint for
Forfeiture, directs the United States Marshal to seize the article in contention, and
requests the court to condemn the article and declare forfeiture for violation of the
law. FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, at 6-1 (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/rpm/. Seizing an article may be
accomplished by either taking physical possession or placing in constructive custody
of the court. Id. A condemned article is one in violation of the law. Id. Condemned
articles may be disposed of in a variety of ways, including constructive destruction,
sale, conversion or destruction. Id. at 6-1-11.
22
Id. at 1219.
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the corresponding Food and Drug Administration (“the FDA”)
regulation.23 In deciding this issue, the Seventh Circuit followed the
FDA’s proposed statutory interpretation.24 While the Seventh Circuit’s
decision resulted in the correct outcome on the set of facts before it,
the court’s interpretation limits the scope of the provision. The
practical effect of the decision reduces the potential opportunity for the
importation of otherwise safe drugs and thus reduces the potential
benefits the statute represented to the drug-consuming population in
the United States. However, at the same time, the Seventh Circuit’s
decision may generate more attention and cause the import restrictions
on prescriptions drugs to be investigated in a new light.
This article will examine and explore what the repercussions of
the Genendo decision are for the future of drug importation. Part I
provides the background of the case. Part II introduces the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“the FDCA”) and the sections relevant
to Genendo. Part III examines the district court decision and Part IV
explains the Seventh Circuit’s decision. Part V analyzes the Seventh
Circuit’s approach, and Part VI discusses the broader policy and
practical implications of the Seventh Circuit’s decision.
I. UNITED STATES V. GENENDO
A. Factual Background
Genendo is a corporation headquartered in the Netherlands, which
purchases, trades and sells pharmaceuticals.25 As part of its business,
Genendo imports drugs into the United States that were both
manufactured abroad and intended for distribution abroad.26 At the
heart of the issue in this case is Lipitor manufactured by Pfizer in

23

United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 962–63.
25
United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1209 (N.D.
Ill. 2005), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th
Cir. 2007).
26
Id.
24
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Ireland,27 and bought by Genendo in Argentina.28 Genendo planned to
import the Lipitor into the United States to Phil & Kathy’s, an FDAapproved repackaging and labeling facility29 located in Illinois.30
Pursuant to a written agreement between Phil & Kathy’s and Genendo,
Phil & Kathy’s would then repack and relabel the Lipitor.31
In September and October of 2003, Genendo sent letters to the
U.S. Attorney’s Office alerting the government of its plan to import
the Lipitor to Phil & Kathy’s.32 Prior to these letters, Genendo
unsuccessfully filed a declaratory judgment action to clarify its rights
to import the Lipitor.33 Genendo subsequently went forward with the
importation of the Lipitor, but, on December 16, 2003, the government
seized the Lipitor on its way to Phil & Kathy’s.34
Pfizer received an FDA-approved new drug application (“NDA”)
for Lipitor.35 Under that NDA, Lipitor to be sold in the U.S. must be
manufactured in Loughbeg, Ireland or Vega Baja, Puerto Rico and
must be packaged in Freiburg, Germany, or Vega Baja, Puerto Rico.36
Additionally, the NDA specifies that the labeling for Lipitor must be in
English, and its expiration period is two years from the manufacture
date.37
The imported Lipitor was manufactured in the NDA-approved
facility in Loughbeg, Ireland but was packaged in Guarulhos SP,

27

Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1210.
29
Id. at 1213.
30
Id. at 1212.
31
Id. The Agreement also covered Zocor imported by Genendo that was also in
dispute. Id. at 1207. However, the Zocor ruling was not appealed and will not be
addressed in this article.
32
Id. at 1210.
33
Id. at 1209–10. Genendo sought a declaration that importing the Lipitor was
authorized under the FDCA; however, the district court granted a motion brought by
the United States to dismiss the action because there was not an agency action ripe
for review. Id. at 1210.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1210.
36
Id. at 1212.
37
Id.
28
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Brazil.38 Additionally, the imported Lipitor bore labels in Portuguese
that displayed expiration dates three years from the manufacture
date.39
B. The Procedural Posture
After seizing the imported Lipitor, the government brought suit
against Genendo40 seeking condemnation of the imported Lipitor as
both an unapproved new drug and as a misbranded drug.41 The
government also sought a permanent injunction to prohibit Genendo
from violating the FDCA with similar imports in the future.42 Genendo
responded that the imported Lipitor was not an unapproved new drug
or a mislabeled drug because it fell within the exemption of 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(a) and 21 C.F.R. § 201.150.43
The district court found for the government on all counts,
resulting in the condemnation of the imported Lipitor and the entry of
a permanent injunction against Genendo.44 Genendo appealed the
district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit.45 The issue presented to
the Seventh Circuit was whether the imported Lipitor was an
unapproved new drug or whether the imported Lipitor was exempt
from the NDA provisions under § 353.46
Before analyzing the district court and Seventh Circuit decisions,
more explanation of the FDCA and its relevant provisions is necessary.
38

Id. The Brazil facility is not listed as an approved facility on the NDA and
has not been inspected by the FDA. Id.
39
Id. at 1210–11.
40
The United States also sued Phil & Kathy’s, but the parties entered into a
consent decree settling their claims. Id. at 1212.
41
Id. at 1207.
42
Id.
43
Id. As explained in more detail, infra at II.B., § 353(a) and § 201.150
together state an exemption that drugs in transit to and held at a repackaging facility
do not have to comply with certain labeling and packaging requirements of the
FDCA.
44
Id. at 1219. The analysis of the district court’s decision is discussed infra at
III.
45
United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2007).
46
Id. at 962.
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II. THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT
A. Brief Overview of the FDCA
The first Food and Drugs Act, passed in 1906, prohibited the
introduction of misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks and drugs
into interstate commerce.47 The 1906 Act was repealed in 1938 and
replaced with the enactment of the current FDCA.48 Over the years,
the FDCA has been amended over twenty times, and it currently
regulates a wide range of products, including foods, dietary
supplements, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics.49 The FDA is the
government agency charged with enforcing the FDCA.50
The FDCA has two main goals underlying its enactment: safety
and disclosure. The Supreme Court recently restated this first goal,
stating that a “fundamental precept of the FDCA is that any product
regulated by the FDA – but not banned – must be safe for its intended
use.”51 The second goal, disclosure, is evident through the provisions
demanding truthful information used in labels. This goal traces back to
the 1906 Act, which was partially enacted to prevent the use of “cure-

47

FDA: MILESTONES IN U.S. FOOD AND DRUG LAW HISTORY (1999),
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html.
48
Federal Food Drug And Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397 (2004)).
49
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397.
50
FDA, Laws Enforced by the FDA and Related Statutes,
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/#amendments (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). The
FDA is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Food and
Drug Administration, FDA Organization, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/7org.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007). At the direction of Congress, the Secretary of HHS
promulgates regulations. See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.150 (regulation promulgated in
response to Congress’ instruction in 21 U.S.C. § 353). The FDA then uses these
regulations in its enforcement of the FDCA.
51
Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 142 (2000); See also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943)
(“The purposes of [the FDCA] thus touch phases of the lives and health of people,
which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self
protection.”).
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all” claims for ineffective and often dangerous medicines.52 These
provisions are still found in the current FDCA through misbranding
prohibitions and labeling requirements.53
B. The Relevant Sections of the FDCA
The FDCA has a broad coverage; however, only two of its
provisions are pertinent to the discussion here—section 355 involving
new drug applications (“NDAs”) and § 353 involving exemptions for
certain drugs under the FDCA. Also relevant is the regulation
promulgated by the FDA in response to the mandate in § 353 from
Congress, 21 C.F.R. § 201.150.54 Each of these provisions will be
discussed in turn.
In Genendo, the government asserted that the imported Lipitor
was an unapproved new drug in violation of § 355(a).55 This section is
complex and details the various requirements a pharmaceutical
company must meet to gain FDA approval to market a “new” drug. A
new drug is one not yet “generally recognized among experts . . . as
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .”56 Under §
355, an application for a new drug must be filed detailing, inter alia,
the methods and facilities used for manufacturing, processing and
packaging the drug.57 When the FDA grants approval of an NDA, the

52

FDA, MILESTONES IN U.S. FOOD AND DRUG LAW HISTORY (1999),
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html.
53
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 352(a) (prohibiting introduction of
misbranded drugs or drugs with false or misleading labels into interstate commerce,
respectively); see also FDA, WHAT FDA REGULATES, http://www.fda.gov/
comments/regs.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (stating that the FDA “ensures that
[the regulated products] are honestly, accurately and informatively represented to the
public”).
54
21 C.F.R. § 201.150 (1999) is often referred to as “the § 353 exemption.”
This designation will be used in the remainder of this article.
55
United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2007).
56
21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006).
57
Id. § 355(b)(1)(D).

217
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

drug may then be legally introduced into U.S. interstate commerce.58
Pfizer submitted an NDA and obtained FDA approval for Lipitor;
however, the imported Lipitor did not fully comply with that NDA.59
Despite the non-compliance of the imported Lipitor with the
NDA, Genendo argued that the drugs could lawfully be put into
interstate commerce because they fell within the exemption stated in §
353.60 That statute states in pertinent part:
(a) Regulations for goods to be processed, labeled, or
repacked elsewhere. The Secretary is hereby directed to
promulgate regulations exempting from any labeling or
packaging requirement of this Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.]
drugs and devices which are, in accordance with the practice
of the trade, to be processed, labeled, or repacked in
substantial quantities at establishments other than those
where originally processed or packed, on condition that such
drugs and devices are not adulterated or misbranded under
the provisions of this Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] upon
removal from such processing, labeling, or repacking
establishment.61
The government, however, argued that the imported Lipitor did
not fall within the language of § 353; rather, the § 353 exemption
promulgated by the FDA exempted Genendo from compliance with
only the six packaging and labeling requirements listed in the § 353
exemption.62 The § 353 exemption states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided by paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section, a shipment or other delivery of a drug which is, in
accordance with the practice of the trade, to be processed,
58

Id. § 355(a).
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 960–61. The non-compliance of the imported Lipitor
with the NDA was admitted by Genendo. Id. at 961.
60
Id.
61
21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
62
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962.
59
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labeled, or repacked in substantial quantity at an
establishment other than that where originally processed or
packed, shall be exempt, during the time of introduction into
and movement in interstate commerce and the time of
holding in such establishment, from compliance with the
labeling and packaging requirements of sections 501(b) [21
U.S.C. § 351(b)] and 502 [21 U.S.C. § 352] (b), (d), (e), (f),
and (g) of the act . . . . 63
The six subsections listed in the § 353 exemption generally set forth
conditions under which a drug shall be considered adulterated or
misbranded.64 The statutory interpretation of § 353, and its
corresponding regulation, are at the center of the dispute in Genendo.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
The United States government sought condemnation of the
imported Lipitor on various grounds: first, as an adulterated drug
under 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) that did not comply with the FDA’s
continuing Good Manufacturing Practices (“cGMP”);65 second, as a
63

21 C.F.R. § 201.150(a) (1999). Since this regulation was written, § 502(d)
has been repealed. Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115,
§ 126, 111 Stat. 2296, 2327 (1997).
64
Specifically, § 351(b) states that a drug shall be considered adulterated “[i]f
it purports to be or is represented as a drug . . . and its strength differs from, or its
quality or purity falls below, the standard set forth in [an official] compendium. . . .”
21 U.S.C. § 351(b). Sections 352(b), (e), (f) and (g) refer to package form and
contents of the label, designation of drugs by established names, directions for use
and warnings on the label, and representations as recognized drugs.
65
Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction ¶¶
31–40, United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (No. 03 C 6495), 2003 WL 23799518. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) states that a
drug shall be considered adulterated “if it is a drug and the methods used in, or the
facilities or controls used for, its manufacture, processing, packing or holding do not
conform to or are not operated or administered in conformity with current good
manufacturing practice to assure that such drug meets the requirements of this Act
[21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] as to safety and has the identity and strength, and meets
the quality and purity characteristics, which it purports or is represented to possess.”
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misbranded drug under 21 U.S.C. § 352(c) that did not bear labels in
the English language;66 third, as a misbranded drug under 21 U.S.C. §
352(f) that did not bear adequate directions for use;67 and finally as an
unapproved new drug that was manufactured abroad and not
manufactured, processed and packaged (including its labeling) and
held in full compliance with the NDA for Lipitor.68 Specifically, the
government argued that any drug that does not display the exact label
approved in the NDA is an unapproved new drug.69 The government
also alleged that no exemptions promulgated by the FDA applied to
the drugs to excuse Genendo from compliance with the Englishlanguage and directions for use labeling requirements.70
Genendo asserted several affirmative defenses in response: (1) the
drugs were not misbranded;71 (2) the drugs were not new;72 (3)
Genendo’s activities did not fall within § 331(k) or § 351(a)(2)(B);73
(4) the English label and adequate directions for use label
requirements did not apply to Genendo because Genendo does not
label the drugs—those requirements only apply to Phil & Kathy’s for
The actual violation alleged is of 21 U.S.C. §331(k), which prohibits any person
from causing the “alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the
whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a
food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale
(whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in
such article being adulterated or misbranded.”
66
Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction, supra
note 65, ¶¶ 41–45. 21 U.S.C. § 352 and its implementing regulations, such as 21
C.F.R. § 201.15, set forth detailed requirements for drug labels, including that the
information appear “prominently and conspicuously” in English so that an ordinary
person buying and using the drug can read and understand the label.
67
Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction, supra
note 65 ¶¶ 46–48.
68
Id. ¶¶ 49–52.
69
Id. ¶ 50.
70
Id. ¶¶ 44, 47.
71
Genendo's Verified Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Amended
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction, United States v. 1500
90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 03 C 6495), 2004 WL
2174705 (first and sixth affirmative defenses).
72
Id. (first and fifth affirmative defenses).
73
Id. (third affirmative defense).
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the relabeled product, which the government cannot allege has been
violated since the drugs were seized prior to relabeling;74 (5) the FDA
has effectively prohibited parallel drug importation and thus exceeded
its statutory and regulatory authority.75
The district court proceedings focused on whether the § 353
exemption excused Genendo from fully complying with the NDA for
Lipitor. Siding with the government, the district court held that “a new
drug’s failure to be manufactured and/or packaged according to the
exact requirements of an FDA- approved NDA are not exempted by §
353(a) of the Act.”76 The district court based its holding upon its
reading of the FDCA provisions and Seventh Circuit precedent.77 The
district court quoted United States v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. for the
proposition that “the detailed requirements of the new drug approval
process of § 355 reflect ‘a Congressional view that the way in which
drugs are mixed and packaged is no less important than the chemical
makeup of the drugs.’”78 The district court also relied upon Baxter for
the rule that a drug must comply with all requirements of the NDA in
order to be properly introduced into interstate commerce.79 The district
court also found that Genendo’s proposed reading of the § 353
exemption would eviscerate the protections of the new drug approval
process.80 The court “harmonized” the § 353 exemption with the new
drug approval process by giving “packaging” and “labeling” their
general meaning throughout most of the act, but giving these terms
special meanings within the NDA provisions.81 Packaging and labeling
generally refer to “a type of packaging with descriptive terms” where
74

Id. (fourth affirmative defense).
Id. (seventh affirmative defense). Genendo also alleged that it did not own,
import or control the vast majority of the drugs seized by the FDA. Id. (second
affirmative defense). This defense will not be addressed in this article.
76
1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
77
United States v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1990).
78
1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (citing Baxter, 901 F.2d at
1411).
79
Id. The Seventh Circuit in Baxter did not state such a proposition. See
Baxter, 901 F.2d at 1411.
80
1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
81
Id. at 1217.
75

221
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

13

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

within the NDA provisions, it takes on the special and more specific
meaning, which includes the “‘methods used in, and the facilities and
controls used for, the . . . processing and packing of such drug.’”82
According to the district court, this interpretation harmonized the two
seemingly conflicting provisions while still honoring the sense and
purpose of each.83
Finally, the district court rejected Genendo’s argument that
Kaybel84 should affect the court’s decision. The court distinguished
this case because the repackaged drugs in Kaybel were compliant with
the NDA, unlike the imported Lipitor in the present case.85 In the end,
the district court ruled that the imported Lipitor was subject to
condemnation as an unapproved new drug and permanently enjoined
Genendo from introducing any other unapproved new drugs into
interstate commerce.86
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
Genendo appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh
Circuit.87 The only issue on appeal was whether the imported Lipitor
was a new drug.88 The Seventh Circuit framed the question as whether
§ 353(a) exempted Genendo from compliance with the NDA
requirements, which as a question of statutory interpretation was
subject to de novo review.89 The court thus first had to confront the
question of the level of deference to give the FDA’s interpretation of §
353.90

82

Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D)).
Id.
84
United States v. Kaybel, 430 F.2d 1346 (3d Cir. 1970).
85
1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1217–18.
86
Id. at 1218–19.
87
The case proceeded on appeal under the name United States v. Genendo
Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. May 10, 2007).
88
Id. at 962.
89
Id.
90
Id.
83
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Genendo argued that the statutory language and Congressional
intent were clear and that under Chevron91 the court must give effect to
that intent and not defer to the FDA’s interpretation of the statute.92
Genendo argued that the language of § 353 clearly states that “as long
as the imported, properly manufactured drug is en route to or at the
repacker, it is exempt from any packaging and labeling
requirements.”93 As proof of congressional intent, Genendo relied
upon a statement by Senator Copeland in which he stated that
substances “need not be labeled, and so forth, until after they are ready
actually to be sent on to the ultimate consumer.”94 Thus, since the
imported Lipitor was on its way to Phil & Kathy’s, it could not be an
unapproved new drug or misbranded due to its non-English labels,
allegedly inadequate directions for use, or longer expiration date
periods, since no labels were necessary at all.95 According to Genendo,
these deficiencies in the labels were all to be corrected at Phil &
Kathy’s, pursuant to the written 201.150 Agreement between them,
and the labeling and packaging requirements only applied once the
drugs were outbound from Phil & Kathy’s.96
91

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Under Chevron’s analysis, a court must first look to see if Congress has
spoken to the precise issue. Id. at 842. If they have, that is the end of the inquiry, as
both the agency and the court must adhere to that unambiguous intent. Id. at 842–43.
If, however, Congress has not spoken on the issue or the intent is ambiguous, the
court must ask whether the agency’s construction of the statute is a permissible one.
Id. at 843. The legislative regulation that Congress has left to the agency must be
given deference unless its construction is arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary
to the statute. Id. at 843–44. The deference that the court gives to a federal agency in
this situation is now known as “Chevron deference.” See, e.g., Nat’l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (using the
term “Chevron deference”); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 389
(1999) (referring to the “usual rule of Chevron deference”); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496
U.S. 478, 495 (1990) (using the term “Chevron deference”).
92
Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 C
6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *16–17.
93
Id. at *17 (emphasis in original).
94
Id. at *13–14 (quoting Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, A Statement of
its Legislative Record, 74th Cong. 363 (1938 reprinted 1987)).
95
Id. at *24.
96
Id. at *28.
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The government argued that the district court decision was
correct. First, the government stated that the FDA’s interpretation of §
353 through its regulation was entitled to great deference under
Chevron.97 Without much explanation, the government stated that the
statutory language is ambiguous, and since the FDA was charged with
making a regulation that carries the force of the law, its interpretation
should be respected.98 The government echoed much of the district
court’s decision but went on to state that if Congress had intended to
exempt all of the NDA requirements under § 353, they could have
written that exemption into the statute themselves.99 The government
also disparaged Genendo’s reliance upon Senator Copeland’s
statements because his statement was only useful to show that the
statute’s language was now requiring the FDA to promulgate a
regulation rather than authorizing the FDA to do so.100
The Seventh Circuit held that the FDA’s interpretation deserved
Chevron deference.101 In doing so, the court first asked whether
Congress had spoken to the precise issue.102 The court stated that
“[Section] 353 simply directs ‘the Secretary’ to promulgate regulations
exempting drugs en route to a repackager from labeling packaging
requirements; it does not itself provide for a complete exemption.”103
The court relied on Arner Co. v. United States104 to support the
proposition that Congress would have stated the exemption on its own
rather than provide for a regulation to formulate one.105 The court
rejected Genendo’s argument that Congress had spoken to the issue by
turning to the regulation promulgated by the FDA:
97

Brief for the Appellee United States, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485
F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 03 C 6495), 2006 WL 4820664, at *21.
98
Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)).
99
Id. at *24.
100
Id. at *25. The government contends that there is nothing in the legislative
history to suggest that Congress intended to exempt drugs from the new drug
approval requirements. Id. at *24–25.
101
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962.
102
Id. at 962.
103
Id. at 962–63.
104
142 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1944).
105
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963.
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The problem with Genendo's argument is that it largely
ignores the fact that the promulgated regulation, §
201.150, sets forth specific labeling and packaging
requirements from which drugs being repackaged are
exempt. The particular sections of the FDCA referenced in
§ 201.150 relate to [specific] requirement[s about the
packaging] . . . . Section 201.150 thus does not exempt
drugs in transit to or at a repackager from all labeling and
packaging requirements in the Act, as Genendo suggests-simply those listed.
Thus the statute is not so crystal clear as Genendo
insists.106
The court then turned to an investigation of the meaning of the
word “any” within § 353. The statutory language reads in pertinent
part:
The Secretary is hereby directed to promulgate regulations
exempting from any labeling or packaging requirement of this Act
drugs . . . which are, in accordance with the practice of the trade,
to be processed, labeled, or repacked in substantial quantities at
establishments other than those where originally processed or
packed, on condition that such drugs . . . are not adulterated or
misbranded under the provisions of this Act upon removal from
such processing, labeling, or repacking establishment.107
The court turned first to a dictionary for the meaning of “any,” noting
that the first definition is “‘one, a, an, or some’” while the fourth
definition is “all.”108 The court then states:

106

Id.
21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
108
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963 (citing WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED THIRD
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 96 (2d ed. 2001)).
107
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Although the statute could be read as if any meant all . . . it
could also be read to [mean] some . . . . Given that §
201.150 exempts drugs in transit only from specified
labeling and packaging requirements, the Secretary
apparently understood it to mean the latter.109
In a footnote, the court addressed a recently decided Supreme
Court case cited by Genendo in which the Supreme Court construed
“any” air pollutant to mean “all” air pollutants.110 The court
distinguished this precedent on the basis that the Supreme Court was
construing language in the Clean Air Act, which contained a
“sweeping” definition of air pollutant, whereas the exemption in § 353
does not contain a similar sweeping definition or otherwise indicate
that “any” should be so construed.111 The court concludes that the
Supreme Court’s interpretation in Massachusetts was a specific case
where “any” meant “all” but that the holding was not so broad as to
mandate that this definition be applied in every other case.112
The court concluded that both Genendo’s and the FDA’s readings
of the statute were possible interpretations, and thus that there was
enough ambiguity in the statute such that the court should defer to the
FDA’s chosen interpretation, provided the interpretation was not
arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.113 The court
found that this standard was met and that the interpretation was in line
with the court’s “observation in Baxter that the new drug approval
process ‘illustrates a congressional view that the way in which drugs
are mixed and packaged is no less important than the chemical
makeup of the drugs at issue.’”114 The court noted that under
Genendo’s interpretation, drugs not packaged in conformity with the
109

Id.
Id. at 963 n.3. The Supreme Court decision being discussed is
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
111
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963 n.3.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 963–64.
114
Id. at 964 (citing United States v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1401,
1411 (7th Cir. 1990)).
110
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NDA, such as the imported Lipitor packaged in Brazil, but
subsequently repackaged under the § 353 exemption successfully
avoid the NDA’s requirement that original packaging occur in an
approved facility.115 The court stated that “If such a result were
intended, we believe that the statute and accompanying regulation
would say so explicitly.”116
Genendo argued that the Third Circuit’s holding in United States
v. Kaybel117 mandated a different result. In Kaybel, the court held that
a wholesale distributor did not introduce an unapproved new drug into
interstate commerce when it repackaged the drug without obtaining a
new drug application in its own name first.118 The court distinguished
Kaybel on two grounds. First, Kaybel did not deal directly with §
353.119 Second, the facts of Kaybel involved the repackaging of a drug
that was compliant with the NDA in all respects.120 The court
emphasized that Kaybel’s rationale was that other provisions exist to
protect drugs from being contaminated by repackagers, and this
rationale did not apply to the facts before it.121
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
Based on the set of facts before it, the Seventh Circuit correctly
decided Genendo. The court’s reasoning, however, is problematic. The
court began by noting that the issue before it was one of statutory
interpretation—whether Genendo was exempt under § 353 from
complying with the NDA provisions—which subjected the district
court’s holding to de novo review.122 This led into the main issue of
what level of deference the court should give the FDA’s interpretation
115

Id.
Id.
117
430 F.2d 1346 (3d Cir. 1970).
118
Id. at 1347. The drug manufacturer, Searle, obtained an NDA in its own
name for the drug which was still in effect when the defendant repackaged the drug
into smaller bottles for sale. Id.
119
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 965.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962.
116
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of § 353(a).123 The court determined that the statute is ambiguous and
that it must defer to the reasonableness of the FDA’s interpretation.124
The overarching question is how the court arrived at its conclusion
that the statute is ambiguous. The court’s analysis would be sounder if
they examined whether Congress spoke to the issue, steered away
from reliance upon dictionary definitions, and considered the
legislative history and other sections of the FDCA in its investigation.
A. The Chevron Analysis
1. The Vague Intent of Congress
Under the first step of the Chevron125 analysis:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. 126
The court stated that Genendo believed Congress had spoken directly
to the issue with § 353 by using the phrase “any labeling and

123

Id. at 962.
Id. at 964.
125
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
126
Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).
124
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packaging requirement.”127 The court found this argument problematic
because the § 353 exemption lists specific labeling and packaging
requirements with which a repackaged drug does not have to
comply.128 The court concluded that the § 353 exemption “thus does
not exempt drugs in transit to or at a repackager from all labeling and
packaging requirements in the Act, as Genendo suggests—simply
those listed.”129 On this point, the court is correct. In its brief, Genendo
stated that as a result of the language Congress used in § 353, the FDA
had “no option but to promulgate a regulation that exempted drugs en
route to and while being held by a repacker and labeler from all of the
labeling and packaging requirements of the Act. The FDA ‘performed
this prescribed duty’ when it promulgated [the § 353 exemption].”130
However, it is hard to see how Genendo can argue the FDA correctly
performed its duty by exempting all packaging and labeling
requirements when instead its regulation specifically lists only six of
those requirements.131
Despite this flaw in Genendo’s argument, the court nevertheless
missed the most important part of the argument: just because the
regulation lists six specific packaging and labeling exemptions does
not mean Congress failed to speak directly to the issue. There is
always the possibility that the regulation is improper and has ignored
the direct mandate of Congress. Judicial review of such administrative
constructions is in place to prevent such occurrences. A court is the
final authority on statutory construction and it must reject any
administrative construction that is inconsistent with “clear
congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”132
127

Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962.
Id. at 963.
129
Id.
130
Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *14.
131
The six requirements listed as exempted are sections 501(b) and 502 (b), (d),
(e), (f), and (g). 21 C.F.R. § 201.150(a).
132
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984) (citations omitted); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic
128
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Here, the court only superficially investigated congressional
intent. The only statutory interpretation tool the court consulted was a
dictionary definition.133 Relying on Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary
of the English Language, Second Edition, as its dictionary of choice,
the court stated that “the first definition given for the word any is ‘one,
a, an, or some’” while, of course, “all” is not until the fourth
definition.134 By itself, this approach is questionable. How did the
court determine that the Second Edition of Webster’s Unabridged was
the dictionary with the right definition? A cynical answer is that it was
simply the dictionary sitting on the desk of the law clerk at the time.
However, a different Webster’s Dictionary first defines “any” as
“[o]ne, no matter which, of more than two” and provides “some, no
matter how much or how little, how many, or what kind” as the second
definition.135 In the Oxford English Dictionary, the first definition of
“any” is “[a]n indeterminative derivative of one, or rather its
weakened adj. form . . . [i]ts primary use is in interrogative,
hypothetical and conditional forms of speech” without regard to
kind.136 Oxford’s second definition is “[w]ith a specially quantitative
force = A quantity or number however great or small.”137 The
American Heritage Dictionary’s first definition of “any” is “[o]ne,
some, every, or all without specification.”138 Thus, it would appear
that if the court consulted any (“any” meaning “all” here) of these
dictionaries, the court could have simply picked the dictionary with
the most favorable definition.
If Congress had intended to exempt repackaged drugs from all
packaging and labeling requirements, they could have expressly put

Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (stating that a court must reject
any administrative construction that is inconsistent with Congress’ statutory
mandate).
133
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963.
134
Id.
135
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 64 (4th ed. 2000).
136
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 538 (2d ed. 1989).
137
Id. at 539.
138
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2000) (emphasis added).
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that language into the statute, as the court implied.139 However, the
argument also swings the other way. Congress could have either used
the word “some” in place of “any” in § 353 or defined “any” within §
353 if they did not mean to exempt the drugs from all labeling and
packaging requirements. Congress did not do either of these.
Rather than solely relying upon a dictionary definition, the court
could have consulted other sections and subsections of the FDCA for
guidance. For example, the word “any” is used twenty-five times other
than the disputed instance in § 353 alone.140 A brief glance at these
other uses of “any” demonstrates that “any” cannot mean “some” in
every single use of the word. Nor can “any” mean “all” in each
instance. This suggests that finding the right definition for this
particular instance is likely not as easy as flipping open the dictionary
and using the first definition. The word has to be read in context of
both the specific section and the entire statute.
More importantly, the court could have consulted the legislative
history of § 353. The entire FDCA went through many versions,
resulting in various congressional reports and floor debates.141 One
such report notes that:
Section 503 [21 U.S.C. § 353] prescribes exemptions from
labeling requirements for drugs and devices similar to
those provided for food when the articles are to be
processed, labeled, or repacked at points other than their
place of production and when, after the processing,
labeling, or repacking they comply with the terms of the
law . . . .142
In its brief, cited Senator Copeland, the sponsor of the FDCA, on the
Senate floor:

139

Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962–63.
See 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2000).
141
HARRY A. TOULMIN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FOOD, DRUGS AND
COSMETICS § 7 (1942).
142
Id. at § 251 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 75-2139 (1938)).
140
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[P]erhaps the Senator did not know that on line 3 we have
stricken out the word "authorized" and have provided that
the Secretary shall be directed. The Secretary is directed to
promulgate regulations exempting from labeling such
articles as those to which the Senator has referred.
I am satisfied that with this change, which was
suggested by the Senator from Michigan [Mr.
Vandenberg], directing the Secretary to take such action,
we are not leaving the matter to anybody. The Secretary
must do what the Senator seeks to have done when the
substances covered by the provision are shipped in large
quantities and are not sold to the consumer. They need not
be labeled, and so forth, until after they are ready actually
to be sent on to the ultimate consumer. So I feel that under
subsection (1) the industry in which the Senator is
interested is fully protected, in view of the fact that we
have not given the Secretary any option in the matter, but
he must perform this prescribed duty.143
Another Legislative statement shows the reasoning behind this
prescribed duty: “This exemption is necessary to avoid unwarranted
interference with certain legitimate commercial operations, such as the
canning of food at branch canneries and delivery to a central plant for
labeling, or the bulk shipment of crude drugs for processing and
repacking before distribution to consumers.”144 A House Report also
explained that, with respect to the food, “these exemptions will apply
only where the interests of consumers will not be jeopardized.”145
These congressional statements, when read together, demonstrate
that it was the intent of Congress that the exemptions apply so that
certain legitimate commercial operations would not be interfered with,
so long as the consumer’s interests would not be jeopardized. The
legislative intent, demonstrated by these statements, was to protect the
143

Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *13–*14 (emphasis in original).
144
S. REP. NO. 73–493, at 9 (1934).
145
H.R. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 6 (1938).
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consumer. This legislative intent supports the ultimate result in
Genendo and would give more credibility to the court’s reasoning.
However, Genendo did not base its holding on this congressional
intent. Rather, the court held that the statutory language was
ambiguous enough to merit turning to the FDA’s interpretation of the
rule.146
2. The Reasonableness of Agencies
Once a court has determined that it will defer to an agency’s
interpretation, its holding is rarely disturbed because of the high
arbitrary and capricious standard.147 In Genendo, it would be hard to
argue that the FDA’s interpretation was arbitrary, capricious or
manifestly contrary to the statute. The regulation only exempts the
packaging and labeling requirements “that the package contain the
name and address of the manufacturer or distributor, a statement of the
quantity of the contents, the established name of the drug, active and
inactive ingredients, and adequate warnings and directions for use.”148
This leaves in place other provisions mandating proper handling of
drugs to ensure their safety. The court correctly points out that the
interpretation appears to be “consistent with the public health concerns
animating the new drug approval process and the FDCA as a
whole.”149 It is important to keep in mind that the agency
interpretation need not be the only permissible interpretation nor does
it have to be the interpretation at which the court would have reached
if construing the statute on its own.150
Accordingly, Genendo’s interpretation raises an interesting
question as to whether its interpretation would have been permissible
had it been the position advanced by the FDA. Genendo claimed that
exempting the imported Lipitor from all packaging and labeling
146

Genendo 485 F.3d at 963–64.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
148
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963.
149
Id. at 964.
150
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
147
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requirements did not put consumers at any risk because both § 353 and
the § 353 exemption still contained a requirement that the drugs not be
adulterated or misbranded.151 Thus, any deviations from the NDA that
occurred before the drugs were repackaged would still result in the
drugs being properly seized as misbranded or adulterated.152 The court
in Genendo stated that “even assuming a flawless repackaging process
at Phil & Kathy’s . . . certain deviations from the NDA’s requirements
are never rectified despite the repackaging. Notably, the fact that the
Lipitor was packaged at an unapproved facility in Brazil can never be
brought into compliance with the NDA.”153 Genendo’s response was
that Congress and the FDA determined through § 353 and the § 353
exemption that the only NDA requirement that needed to be complied
with when a drug is being imported is that it was manufactured in an
NDA-approved, and thus FDA-approved, facility.154 The result of this
regulatory scheme would adequately safeguard consumers.155
If this were the FDA’s interpretation and the government’s
argument before the court, the court would likely have to defer to it.
“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation.”156 If the FDA determined that
consumers were adequately safeguarded by such a construction, then
the interpretation would also be in line with the underlying purposes of
the FDCA. Courts are typically viewed as unqualified to determine
whether the agency’s interpretation is correct. Instead courts must
defer to the agency because their interpretation is considered
reasonable.157
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Genendo, 485 F.3d at 964.
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Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *23.
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Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984).
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Id. at 844.
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2. Other Bumps in the Road: Distinguishing the Case Law
On the way to reaching the correct result, the court also had to
face some case law that appeared to be on point. First, the court faced
the Supreme Court’s new decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,158 in
which the Supreme Court construed “any air pollutant” to mean “all”
air pollutants.159 While this decision would seem quite relevant, the
Genendo court correctly disposed of this argument in a footnote. As
discussed infra, the word “any” cannot be given a single meaning
within § 353 itself. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of “any” in a completely different Act could be
the definitive meaning of the word in § 353 as well.
The court also had to deal with the Kaybel case from the Third
Circuit.160 The Kaybel case is easily distinguishable from the facts at
bar because the drugs in Kaybel were packaged at an NDA-approved
facility.161 In addition, neither § 353 nor the § 353 exemption are at
issue in Kaybel.162 Genendo’s argument is that the Kaybel court’s
holding is that, “when a valid NDA is in place for the solid oral dosage
form of a drug, deviations from the packaging and labeling listed on
the NDA do not convert approved solid oral dosage forms of drugs
into ‘unapproved new drugs.’”163 Genendo reiterated their version of
this holding again as “packaging and labeling do not affect a drug’s
status as an approved ‘new drug.’”164 However, with these statements,
Genendo repeatedly overstates the holding in Kaybel. The Kaybel
court never stated that where a drug was packed is irrelevant to
whether it is a “new drug.” The Kaybel court, in fact, says very little in
its short opinion. The Seventh Circuit correctly dismisses Kaybel as
having very little applicability to the set of facts before it.
158

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963 n. 3.
160
United States v. Kaybel, 430 F.2d 1346 (3d Cir. 1970).
161
Id. at 1347.
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Id.
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Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *6.
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Id. at *16.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING
A. Packaging Concerns and Health Considerations
The FDCA was put in place to protect consumers from the
inherent dangers accompanying the drug production process. Both the
district court and Seventh Circuit were correctly concerned that
imported Lipitor came from an unapproved packaging facility in
Brazil. As the Seventh Circuit noted, there was no way of knowing the
conditions under which the imported Lipitor was originally packaged
and no way of later correcting any of these deficiencies at a repacking
facility such as Phil & Kathy’s.165
The FDCA takes these packaging considerations into account in
various places. For instance, under § 351(a)(2)(A), a drug will be
considered adulterated “if it has been prepared, packed or held under
insanitary conditions whereby it may have been contaminated with
filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health . . . .”
These same concerns with packaging are reflected in numerous other
places throughout the Act.166
Could these packaging provisions have acted as a check on the
behavior of parties such as Genendo and Phil & Kathy’s? Consider a
hypothetical situation the same as ours here. The Lipitor is
manufactured at an FDA-approved facility, but packaged at a facility
in Brazil that is not FDA-approved, and instead of being seized at the
border, the drugs enter the United States and are successfully
repackaged at Phil & Kathy’s. According to Genendo’s argument, the
imported Lipitor—and “any other similarly manufactured, packaged,
labeled, and unadulterated drugs Genendo would import in the
future”—would not be unapproved new drugs or misbranded because
they are exempt from the labeling and packaging requirements of the

165

Genendo, 485 F.3d at 964.
See e.g., 21 U.S.C. §351(a)(2)(B) (2000) (stating that a drug that is
adulterated if the method of its packing does not conform to good manufacturing
practices).
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FDCA while on their way to Phil & Kathy’s.167 This argument
assumes that the drugs are unadulterated, claiming immunity from
being unapproved new drugs nor misbranded. However, if the drugs
were packaged in Brazil under insanitary conditions, they are by
definition adulterated and subject to seizure.168 This is true without
relying upon a statutory construction of § 353 that prohibits any
importation of drugs that are not fully compliant with an NDA. The
argument that the drugs are unapproved new drugs becomes moot.
Conversely, if the drugs packaged in Brazil are not exposed to
insanitary conditions, they are not adulterated.169 However, they would
still fail to comply with the NDA because they were packaged in a
different packaging facility, the labels are not in English, and the
expiration period is different.170 Thus, under the current statutory
interpretation, they would be unapproved new drugs subject to
seizure.171 But what is the harm to the consumer in this case? None of
the concerns with unsafe drugs resulting from insanitary packaging
would come into play.172 This would then allow parties such as
Genendo to import drugs lawfully into the United States for
distribution, after a repackaging facility such as Phil & Kathy’s
ensures that all of the proper labels, expiration dates, and other
relevant information are placed on the drugs. Consumers would
benefit by gaining access to another source to obtain safe and effective
medication with full and accurate disclosures.
Finally, in the situation that the imported drugs were
manufactured in an unapproved manufacturing facility, Genendo’s

167

Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *5 (emphasis added).
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21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(A) (2000)
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Id.
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United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1212 (N.D.
Ill. 2005), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th
Cir. 2007).
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Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963–64.
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Id. at 964.
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own argument admits that such drugs are unapproved new drugs
subject to seizure.173
B. Does Genendo Foreclose All Parallel Imports?
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statute effectively
prevents the majority of parallel imports. Any drug that a company
such as Genendo wants to import will have to be purchased after it has
been manufactured and packaged at an NDA- approved, and thus
FDA-approved, facility. In the present case, this would leave Genendo
with only the possibility of buying Lipitor from Frieburg, Germany or
Vega Baja, Puerto Rico and not Sao Paulo, Brazil.174 The probable
reason the Brazilian facility is not an FDA-approved packaging
facility175 is because the drugs being packaged there are intended for
distribution abroad. Pfizer has no reason to go through a rigorous FDA
inspection for approval of its Brazilian facility if they do not plan for
those drugs to enter the United States. This begs the question as to
why Pfizer would even allow Genendo to purchase the Lipitor in
Brazil. It clearly is not in Pfizer’s interests to have that Lipitor sold in
the United States or else the company would be doing that itself.
Meanwhile, if Genendo is limited to purchasing drugs
manufactured and packaged at an FDA-approved facility, it will have
to ensure that the only deviations from the NDA are those listed in the
§ 353 exemption.176 This could be a hefty task, especially without
access to the company’s manufacturing and packaging information. It
is easy to see how the transaction costs quickly rise in such a situation
making it unfeasible for someone other than the drug’s own
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Brief for Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *12.
174
Genendo, 485 F.3d at 961.
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Id.
176
Id. at 963. Again, those listed exemptions “relate to the requirement that the
package contain the name and address of the manufacturer or distributor, a statement
of the quantity of the contents, the established name of the drug, active and inactive
ingredients, and adequate warnings and directions for use.” Id.
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manufacturer to import the drug into the United States. Thus, the
parallel import is effectively prohibited.
If this is the result Congress intended, it could have drafted the
original statute accordingly. Congress has demonstrated that it is
capable of drafting such a section to prevent certain types of imports
when it drafted § 381. That section prohibits anyone other than the
manufacturer from re-importing into the United States drugs originally
manufactured within the United States but shipped abroad for
distribution.177 In that same regard, Congress could have responded
with later legislation accomplishing this goal.
This brings to the forefront the question of why has Congress not
yet acted to explicitly declare parallel imports either legal or illegal?
The cynical answer is that Congress is unduly influenced by the
pharmaceutical lobby, whose interest it is to block the passage of a
statute explicitly allowing parallel imports.178 The pharmaceutical
lobby maintains more than 600 lobbyists, more than one lobbyist for
each member of Congress.179 These lobbyists spent $435 million in
Washington from 1996 to 2003, and doled out almost fifty-eight
million dollars in contributions.180
Despite the presence of this strong lobby, it is clear that
something needs to be done by Congress. In its first argument to the
court, Genendo stated that parallel imports would have a cost saving
result for American consumers181and much of American public echo
this sentiment.182 There are also those on the other side of the argument
who take the view that such imports will result in minimal savings for
American consumers.183 Both sides of the argument have some merit,
but it is Congress’ job to arrive at a conclusion. An unbiased report
177

21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2006).
Barlett, supra note 4, at 1, 3.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *i.
182
See, e.g., HHS TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 65 (noting that consumers
import drugs because they believe save money by buying outside of the United
States).
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Danzon, supra note 11; HHS TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at XI, XIII.
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would greatly assist Congress in this task. The process will have to be
transparent so that it can be ensured neither the pharmaceutical lobby
nor any “pro-import” group can unfairly effect the outcome.
Furthermore, the public needs to be educated; a greater understanding
of the true benefits and downfalls of drug importation will help dispel
many myths that currently exist184 and help ensure that the public
understands the final compromise reached by Congress.
However, while the debate in Congress goes on, many Americans
will continue to import their drugs in other ways, such as through
online pharmacies or by driving to Canada or Mexico, all the while
facing the threat that the drugs they buy will be part of the twenty-five
percent counterfeit or substandard drugs found in developed
countries.185 Consumers are in an impossible position – they must
choose between not getting any drugs at all because they cannot afford
them, or getting drugs from outside the United States and taking a
chance of suffering adverse consequences if the drugs are not safe.
Consumers should not have to face this risk. This defeats the whole
purpose of Congress’ attempt to protect consumers and ensure the
safety of their drugs through the FDCA.186
In order to reduce the amount of American consumers forced to
turn outside our borders for their drugs, the FDA inspection process at
our borders needs report. The FDA is already overburdened with the
usual load of imports it must inspect on a daily basis. In 2001 at a
House Committee hearing, Representative Greenwood reported that in
the course of one month U.S. Customs detained 16,000 shipments in
the Los Angeles mail facility alone, yet only had time to inspect 1,900

184

See, e.g., Gracie Marie Turner, Drug Importation Myths Debunked, TRISTATE MEDIA, June 20, 2007, http://www.tristatemedia.com/articles/2007/06/20/warricknews/editorial/01drug.txt; Nina Owcharenko,
Debunking the Myths of Drug Importation, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, July 20,
2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm542.cfm. Note that the
accuracy of these “myths” may also be questioned.
185
PFIZER, CASE STUDY: COUNTERFEIT CONTENTS, http://www.pfizer.com/
files/products/CounterfeitContents.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
186
See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
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of those shipments.187 The other shipments continued on to their
destinations without any FDA inspection.188 The Department of Health
and Human Services confirms the burden on the FDA, stating that the
“FDA currently does not have sufficient resources to ensure adequate
inspection of current levels and categories of personal shipments of
prescription drugs entering the U.S.”189
If parallel imports, like that in Genendo, are explicitly made legal,
what can be done to improve this deficient inspection process? One
step would be to follow the lead of Genendo. Genendo twice notified
the government of its intention to import Lipitor into the United States
after trying to obtain a declaratory judgment that its actions were
legal.190 This notification probably gave the government sufficient
knowledge to seize the imported Lipitor in the first place.191
Subsequent importers should be required to follow this practice.
Putting the burden on the importer to notify the United States may
help facilitate inspections and ensure the quality of drugs entering the
country. Importers seeking to avoid inspection will of course not
follow such protocol. However, the importers who do abide by such a
procedure will be the legitimate ones and the burden on the FDA
would thus be lightened and would allow them to devote more time to
stopping rogue importers. A second necessity is that the FDA simply
needs more help. This is only going to come through additional
funding from Congress. The inspection process cannot become more
efficient with the current FDA importation field staff of 450
workers.192 More people working on inspections means that more safe
drugs will be properly allowed into the United States, and more
importantly, more unsafe drugs will be stopped at our borders.
187

PFIZER, CASE STUDY: BILLION DOLLAR BUSINESS, http://www.pfizer.com/
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CONCLUSION
The facts of Genendo193 cast an interesting light over the on-going
debate over how to lower prescription drug prices. The court’s holding
in Genendo was correct under the facts before it. It was unclear
whether the imported Lipitor had in fact been originally packaged
under sanitary conditions. The court erred on the side of safety.
However, in arriving at this holding, the court’s statutory
interpretation of § 353 reduced opportunities for the importation of
safe drugs. The result is that U.S. consumers will not benefit from a
safe and inexpensive alternative drug source and may be forced to turn
once again to drastic measures in order to save money on drug
purchases. The court’s attempt to promote the safety and welfare of
American prescription drug consumers thus has the opposite intended
effect: consumers are forced to weigh the choice of having no drugs at
all, or gambling that far cheaper drugs purchased abroad or on black
markets will be safe and effective. This certainly was not the goal of
the court in issuing its decision, and it certainly is not a decision
American consumers should have to make.
This is not an easy issue to resolve. Few consumers would
question the requirement that the manufacturing and packaging plants
be inspected and approved. The rigorous approval process is why
consumers feel safe in using the drugs they receive in the United
States.194 However, few consumers would also question the need to
lower the costs of prescription drugs. How does Congress balance the
consumer need for cheap, effective prescription drugs with the
enormous research and development costs pharmaceutical companies
must somehow recoup?
American consumers are not waiting around for Congress to
answer this question. They will continue importing drugs from abroad
193

485 F.3d 958.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH POLL REPORT: VIEWS ON
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAFETY (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.kff.org/
healthpollreport/feb_2005/3.cfm (noting that Eighty percent of the population feels
at least “somewhat” comfortable with the safety of prescription drugs they
purchase).
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until congressional action is taken. By going out on their own and
purchasing potentially counterfeit or substandard drugs, American
consumers undermine Congress’ goal of providing safe and effective
drugs through the FDCA. Congress needs to specifically address the
import issue in order to curtail this growing problem. This will require
Congress to stand fast in the face of the powerful pharmaceutical
lobby, which has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo. To
ensure that it does not appear to be catering to the pharmaceutical
lobby, Congress needs to be unbiased and as transparent as possible in
the process of making a decision.
Congress also needs to ensure that better mechanisms be put in
place to ensure that counterfeit and substandard drugs are not entering
the United States, lawfully or not. Congress must ensure that the
health of the majority of Americans who depend on prescription drugs
on a daily basis is not jeopardized.195 As part of this, the FDA
inspection process needs to become more efficient. More inspections
need to take place at our borders. This will require an increase in the
number of FDA staff performing inspections, which in turn will
require increased FDA funding. As more packages detained by the
FDA are checked, the safety and efficiency goals of the FDCA are
more fully served. These are legitimate but difficult policy issues that
need to be addressed in the very near future.
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See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 1.
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